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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AcT-TEsT OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP-Claimant was employed as a salesman by a copartnership at a regular
salary. The partnership was composed of three inen, one of whom, R. L.
Keppen, managed the business, for which he was paid a salary of $175 per
month, independently of his share of the profits of the partnership. The other
partners received no salary, being dependent upon partnership dividends for
their return upon the investment. If Keppen could be considered an employee
of the firm during the time· of the claimant's employment, then there would
have been coinplial!ce with the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act,
which required that a firm, in order to come within its s~ope, must have employed eight or more persons for twenty or more calendar weeks in each of the
years during which the claimant was employed by it.1 Held, a member of a
partnership cannot be an employee thereof within the meaning of this unemployment compensation act, even though he performs labor for it and receives
a salary apart from his share of the profits, becuase he cannot be, at the same
time employer and employee, and because a partner in rendering services to the
partnership is only carrying out his obligations as a member thereof, rather than
acting as an employee. Auten v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Com-mission, 310 Mich. 453, 17 N.W. (2d) 249 (1945).
The decision in the principal case, that a working partner, receiving a
salary apart from his return as a member of the partnership, is not an employee
within the meaning of the unemployment compensation act, represents the
view of the majority of courts who have had to decide the question,2 and it
seems to follow in line with the court's view as to a proper interpretation of
the statute. The preceding statute had expressly stated that working members
of a partnership receiving wages, separate from partnership profits, had the
status of employees.3 When the legislature, in enacting the present statute, did
not expressly include working partners as employees it could not be said that it
was intended that they should be included, and the court has arrived at what
seems to be the proper decision by so holding. Thus we have the policy of this
state, "to consider working members of a partnership employees only when there
is legislation to that effect.'~ 4 Only a few courts have decided the question conerence as to part of the money which rightfully and completely belongs to the taxpayer's employer." At p. 552, Justice Burton answers this argument, "This priority
of the tax lien is hardly an adequate argument to eliminate the tax itself. At most it is
an argument for Congress to modify the tax lien in favor of the victim." A further
answer to Justice Murphy's contention is that where the embezzler still has some of
the funds in his hands the government has no priority over the rightful owner, since
a court of equity would consider the. wrongdoer as trustee of such funds for the party
from whom the funds were misappropriated.
1 Mich. Acts (1936) No. 1, as amended by Mich. Acts (1941) No. 364, Mich.
Comp. Laws (Mason, Supp. 1940) § 8485-41 et seq., Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1944)
§ 1,7.501 et seq.
2 71 C.J. 504, § 234.
3 Mich. Acts (1921) No. 173, Mich. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1922) § 5429, Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1937 and Supp. 1945) § 17.147.
"""4Auten v. Mich. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 3 IO Mich. 453
at 457, 17 N.W. (2d) 249 (1945).

RECENT DECISIONS

trary to the holding here. 5 The importance of the employer-employe~ relationship has come to the fore with the rapid growth in recent years of social legislation for the benefit of the employee. This growth has led necessarily to a reexamination of the criteria of the employer-employee relationship where the
statutes have not set out the standards for determination of the relationship in
a sufficiently detailed fashion. 6 However, the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act, like unemployment compensation acts in a number of other states, 7
provides its own tests, and in such a complete fashion that there is no necessity
to look elsewhere for a proper concept of the relationship. 8 A few courts, disregarding the language of their statutes, have continued to look to the common
law definitions for a determination of the question.9 But the court in the principal case follows what seems to be the wiser course where it says, "In interpreting the definitive provisions of the act we shall have in mind the purpose of
the law, the policy declared by the legislature, and that common law rules as to
the relation of master and servant, as well as the ordinary rules governing copartnership, provide no controlling tests as against those tests enumerated in the
act." 10 Under the present heavy fip.ancial burden imposed upon him by social
legislation there is a temptation for the employer, by means of contracts with
his employees, to create an appearance of a relationship other than that of employer-employee and thus escape having to bear his share of the load.11 The view
of the Michigan court will tend to prevent this sort of thing, because, by doing
away with the common law definition of the employer-employee relationship, it
5
See Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 86 Okla. 139, 207 P.
314 (1922).
6
For excellent discussions of this see Wolfe, "Determination of EmployerEmployee Relationships in Social Legislation," 41 CoL. L. REv. 1015 (1941); Stevens,
"The Test of the Employment Relation," 38 M1cH. L. REV. 188 (1939).
7
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
8
The language of the North Carolina court in•construing its statute is illuminating
on this point. "The scope and purpose of the present act are exceptional in breadth.
The draftsmanship of the definition section, which gives flesh and sinew to the whole,
shows a carefully considered and deliberate purpose to leap many legal barriers which
would halt less ambitious enactments. As far as language will permit it, the act evinces
a studied effort to sweep beyond and to include, by redefinition, many individuals who
would have been otherwise excluded from the benefits of the act by the former concepts of master and servant and principal and agent as recognized at common law."
Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co.,
215 N.C. 479 at 486, 25 S.E. (2d) 584 (1939).
9
It is interesting to note that the Washington court, despite the clear language of
its statute, held that the tests therein set out for determining the employment relationship did not differ from the common law, and that the legislature therefore intended
that the common law test of employment relationship should be the test under the
Washington Unemployment Compensation Act. Washington Recorder Publishing Co.
v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939). But see McDermott v. State, 196
Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938).
10
Principal case at 250.
11
See 41 CoL. L. REV. 1015 (1941).
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is doirtg away with the technical niceties of that definition which the clever
lawyer finds so easy to circumvent.
John S. Dobson, S.Ed.

